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 I have chosen to confront the historical and current situation regarding 
Christianity and its relationship to Communist China. My intent was to begin by 
giving a brief history. However, a brief history of this particular relationship is not 
possible to accomplish my goal in this instance. This subject is so deep and intricate 
that it can only be offered in depth in order to address my questions properly. 
Following this necessary in-depth history, I intend to convey the recent 
circumstances which have driven many Chinese citizens towards a religious 
affiliation. More explicitly I will suggest a plausible explanation as to why 
Christianity is outpacing all of the other traditional religions, such as the recent 
tendency to lean towards Western influences rather than traditional Chinese ones 
because of dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs. In closing I will answer 
the question of why members of the People’s Republic of China have turned to the 
Christian religion specifically although there are several other options available.  
 The historical relationship between China and Christianity has been one of 
extreme adversity. The most fundamental problem for Christianity and its existence 
in China is that it is a religion where one answers to God first and government 
second. Because “religion has always been regulated by the state”1, and the Chinese 
tradition is one where “the government is the master” and “religion is the 
follower”2; a tradition of anti-Christianity has reportedly existed as far back as the 
early seventeenth century3. More recently there are many contributing factors to 
this tradition of disapproval of Christianity in China, such as “the attitude of 
                                                          
1 Merle Goldman, "Religion in Post-Mao China," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 
483 (January 1986): 147. 
2 Richard Madsen, "The Upsurge of Religion in China," Journal of Democracy 21, no. 4 (2010): 66.  
3 Paul A. Cohen, "The Anti-Christian Tradition in China," The Journal Of Asian Studies 20, no. 2 (February 1961): 
170. 
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indifference of the Peace Conference to the problems of the Far East and of China”, 
and “the lack of recognition by the League of Nations given to China” 4. A strong 
“national feeling in China”5 during the nineteenth century caused “the vast majority 
of the educated classes” to “either passively or actively” reject religions altogether6. 
According to Cohen, professor of history emeritus at Wellesley College and associate 
at the Harvard Fairbank Center, expressions of hostility were exposed by creating 
and distributing inflammatory anti-Christian literature and “issuing threats of 
retaliation against any who dared enter the religion”.7 When the Chinese Communist 
Party came to power, just as its ideology advocated, it “regarded missionaries as the 
most invidious representatives of the Western imperialism that had humiliated 
China.”8 This impression of insult stemmed from the lack of recognition that China 
received from the League of Nations following World War I. China’s contribution 
was offered in good faith that the Shandong Province would be returned to China 
following the war, but their request was basically ignored during the Peace 
Conferences. Despite assurances that what was decided was in China’s favor, the 
United States was viewed as having betrayed China.9 Following the Shandong 
Problem China’s considerable amount of disapproval regarding foreign religions, 
especially Christianity, was primarily due to fact that the religion originated from 
outside China and was therefore justifiably widely condemned.  
                                                          
4Lewis Hodous, "The Anti-Christian Movement in China," The Journal of Religion 10, no. 4 (1930): 487. 
5 Hodous, "The Anti-Christian Movement in China," 487. 
6 Cohen, "The Anti-Christian Tradition in China," 169. 
7 Ibid 
8 Goldman, "Religion in Post-Mao China," 148. 
9 Bruce A. Elleman, Wilson and China: a Revised History of the Shandong Question (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 
2002), 125. 
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 When Mao Zedong came to power in 1949, Karl Marx’s statement that 
“religion is the opiate that the capitalist class” uses “to anesthetize the people”—
became the standard understanding of the Marxist view of religion and became the 
basis for putting China’s negative religious policies into practice.10 “With the Chinese 
Communists’ consolidation of authority over the whole of China in the early 1950’s, 
an intolerance of religious beliefs” continued and actually increased in force. 11 
Because of this acceleration towards intolerance and the already established dislike 
for foreign religions and western influences, “Christians suffered harsh 
suppressions in the first 30 years of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) under rule 
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)”12 However, it wasn’t just Christianity that 
suffered during the rule of the CCP. “China’s treatment of other religious groups also 
became less tolerant in 1959, the time of the Great Leap Forward, a massive 
campaign to have China reach Communism quickly.”13 The idea was that if China 
could extinguish all such unnecessary religions, as they perceived Marxist theory to 
suggest as a pertinent element to Socialist societal structure, they would then 
achieve a true and successful Communist state. This idea didn’t come into full 
realization until the “Cultural Revolution”14 which began in 1966. It was then that 
the regime progressed swiftly from a policy of “gradually repressing religion” to 
“extinguishing it altogether.” This movement was meant to be a restructuring of the 
Chinese society on a monumental scale that would lead it into a future of laudable 
                                                          
10 Pilgrim W.K. Lo, "Theology Is Not Mere Sociology: A Theological Reflection on the Reception of the Christian 
Religion in Mainland China," Dialog: A Journal of Theology 43, no. 3 (2004): 160. 
11 Goldman, "Religion in Post-Mao China,"  147. 
12 Fenggang Yang, "Lost in the Market, Saved at MacDonalds," Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 44, no. 4 
(2005): 426. 
13 Goldman, "Religion in Post-Mao China,"  149. 
14 Ibid 
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socialist success. It “began with the elimination of the ‘Four Olds’”15 which were 
referred to as “old ideas, old values, old customs, and old traditions”. “Traditional 
religions” were termed “feudal superstitions” and were thrown into the ‘Four Olds’. 
Their classification in these terms caused it to undergo “severe attack”. Any and all 
outward expressions of religion were “completely forbidden” and “all religious 
ritual was discontinued.” The Cultural Revolution entailed the tearing down or 
closing of all religious centers, the search of people’s houses and personal property 
for any religious relics, and all exposed religious affiliates to be “expelled to the 
“cowshed” in remote areas to undertake a thorough “conversion”. 16 Many could not 
cope with the loss of their religions, nor the peace and spirituality which they 
offered in such a tumultuous time. “Thousands of innocent people were beaten to 
death without knowing why. Thousands committed suicide.” One of the most 
immediate actions the CCP took was to expel or imprison any foreign missionaries. 
The study of religious texts, such as the Bible and the Koran were expressly 
forbidden. All “scholarly writing about Chinese religious history ceased; it was as if 
the religion of China had never existed.”17 China retreated within itself and enacted 
a supreme reconditioning in the Socialist scope according to Marxist-Leninism.  
During the Cultural Revolution, all traces of organized religion became 
undetectable and Mao exercised solid control of the country. What began in 1949, as 
the use of religious research “only to serve atheist propaganda”18, culminated 
                                                          
15 Jiping  Zuo, "Political Religion: The Case of the Cultural Revolution in China," Sociological Analysis 52, no. 1 
(Spring 1991): 101. 
16 Zuo, "Political Religion: The Case of the Cultural Revolution in China," 103. 
17 Zuo, "Political Religion: The Case of the Cultural Revolution in China," 101. 
18 Fenggang Yang, "Between Secularist Ideology and Desecularizing Reality: The Birth and Growth of Religious 
Research in Communist China," Sociology of Religion 65, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 116. 
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between 1967 and 1974, when “not a single article on religion was published in 
journals, magazines or newspapers in the People’s Republic of China.” Not only was 
all religious research completely shut down, but “the few who had written about 
religion in the past were muted, and many of them suffered physical and 
psychological tortures”19. For all outside eyes directed at it, “China appeared to be 
the most secularized country in the world. Not a single temple or church was open 
for public religious service, and people appeared to wholeheartedly believe in 
atheism”20. 
 During Mao’s reign, he used “rituals as a tool”21 to enhance his power. The 
greater part of the public, which the People’s Republic of China was comprised of 
were “poorly educated” and considered easy to fool. 22 With an intense loss of 
religious focus, they turned to government and redirected their support and belief 
towards its success as their new savior. As this transition occurred, “the relationship 
between Mao and the masses was seen as that of the sun and sunflowers. Like 
sunflowers turning toward the sun, the hearts of people turned to Mao.”23 Mao 
exercised his station and power to offer instruction to the people. He encouraged a 
strong socialist mentality and a love and support of country that could not be 
rivaled. His strength grew as people settled in to the new system of belief, and any 
attempt to question the sacred nature of Mao or his thought would be met with 
“reaction as extreme as the response of the Catholic church to sacrilege during the 
                                                          
19 Yang, "Between Secularist Ideology and Desecularizing Reality: The Birth and Growth of Religious Research in 
Communist China,"105. 
20 Ibid, 101. 
21 Zuo, "Political Religion: The Case of the Cultural Revolution in China," 109. 
22 Ibid, 107. 
23 Ibid, 103. 
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Middle Ages.”24 Mao used this devotion, which was for many a redirection of the 
people’s religious faith towards political ritualistic structure, and “in this way, a 
personal god was created”25. According to Jiping Zuo of the University of Nebraska-
Lincoln, the people’s response to the new political system was not actually an 
effective elimination of religion, nor a transition towards atheism. “On the contrary, 
a new religion was created. In the eyes of the masses, there still existed a 
‘supernatural power’”26, Mao had effectively become a god to his people. While the 
socialist agenda supplied all citizens a “cradle-to-grave” form of welfare and a 
guaranteed job, it lacked actual success when all was said and done. 27 As the 
socialist momentum began to falter, Mao garnered dissatisfaction from his fellow 
constituents and became a scapegoat as they claimed he had orchestrated several 
unsuccessful measures. Basically, they blamed the state’s economic shortcomings on 
him. In an effort to remain in favor with the masses, he “personally isolated himself” 
in order to add to his already “mysterious image”28.  
Fortunately for the people of China, Mao died in 1976 and Deng Xiaoping 
succeeded his rule. Deng favored economic reform over Mao’s political ideologies 
regarding Chinese culture and society. As Deng took control of China, “The regime 
moved away from the Cultural Revolution’s destructive approach to religion and 
revived the more tolerant approach of traditional China.”29 Where Mao had imposed 
a strict and complete suppression of religion, Marx’s original quote was 
                                                          
24 Ibid, 105. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid, 103. 
27 Yang, "Lost in the Market, Saved at MacDonalds," 432. 
28 Zuo, "Political Religion: The Case of the Cultural Revolution in China," 106. 
29 Goldman, "Religion in Post-Mao China,"  149-150. 
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reinterpreted as showing his belief that religion maintains an important function in 
communities, “mainly, it provides spiritual comfort for people who are suffering.”30 
It was concluded that, given a spiritual belief to have faith in, people who were faced 
with difficult life situations or met with “terrible loss”31 were better able to cope. 
Religion was seen as a means to offer an “emotional compensation function” that 
“helped reduce anxiety and provided a sense of security and confidence”32 which 
would strengthen the entire social structure as China rebuilt itself. During the 
1980’s, the government took a stance on religion that was referred to as a “zone of 
indifference” where it could choose not to intervene on religious beliefs as it 
carefully began to expand into “areas of social and economic relations.”33 Because of 
Deng’s focus on economic reforms, there has been a “marked departure from the 
repressive policies of the Maoist period.”34 However, this departure was not to be 
construed as a complete surrender to religion as a permanent institution in the 
scheme of socialist politics. The government still seeks “to control religion and 
create an environment in which religion would be regarded as a superstition”35 that 
would ultimately die out on its own as the people realize it is unnecessary. 
 The CCP did not just freely allow all religions to be practiced. It organized 
specific institutions in order to “control religious matters”36 and it also regulated 
which religions it would accept as legitimate and practicable. The CCP established 
                                                          
30 Lo, "Theology Is Not Mere Sociology: A Theological Reflection on the Reception of the Christian Religion in 
Mainland China,"160. 
31 Ibid 
32 Zuo, "Political Religion: The Case of the Cultural Revolution in China," 104. 
33 Pitman B. Potter, "Belief in Control: Regulation of Religion in China," The China Quarterly 174 (2003): 318. 
34 Potter, "Belief in Control: Regulation of Religion in China," 319. 
35 Goldman, "Religion in Post-Mao China," 148. 
36 Ibid. 
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the Bureau of Religious Affairs to oversee religious groups.37 After an in depth 
evaluation of various religions, the CCP ruled to accept five primary religions: 
Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Catholicism and Protestantism in order to “exclude folk 
religions, superstition and cults” from its umbrella of support. 38 Any religious sect 
that could be construed as a threat to the socialist structure was immediately 
blacklisted. Only a specific and carefully selected sequence of religions was allowed, 
and the ultimate goal of the CCP was to eliminate their necessity given time. Also, 
when referring to the members of any of these religious institutions, “if one did not 
accept the authority” of the religion’s assigned oversight institution then they would 
be imprisoned. 39 While presenting a front of religious tolerance, the Party’s main 
agenda was driven to support atheism in any way possible, including what some 
perceive as an abuse of its control over in order to “marginalize religious belief.”40 
 An important aspect of this supposed religious tolerance is that China still 
emphasized an independent stance toward outside influences. Christians were 
required to commit themselves to the “Three Self Movement—self-support, self-
governance, self-propaganda” which according to Merle Goldman, a professor of 
history at Boston University, had nothing to do with self-sufficiency, but rather was 
a decidedly unsuccessful attempt to “cut off Christian groups from contact with the 
West.”41 Under Deng’s rule, it seemed that the key to controlling religious activity 
                                                          
37 Ibid. 
38 Potter, "Belief in Control: Regulation of Religion in China," 320. 
39 Goldman, "Religion in Post-Mao China,"  149. 
40 Potter, "Belief in Control: Regulation of Religion in China," 320. 
41 Goldman, "Religion in Post-Mao China,"  148. 
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lay in “educating the younger generations in historical materialism and atheism, 
rather than in coercion and repression of practitioners.”42 
 During the mid-to-late 1980’s, the government reacted to “an outbreak of 
anti-Chinese unrest”43 by imposing martial law and stepping up their efforts at 
securing political control. During this time the United States was directly portrayed 
as having an interest in “using religion to subvert China.”44 The Chinese regulators 
give “special attention”45 to Christianity partly because of historical links between 
Christian missionary work and imperialism which to the CCP insights a fear of 
internal subversion. In 1999, “special additional measures were enacted” to upset 
any religious activities that would “disrupt social order or harm the people’s lives, 
financial security” or the development of the Chinese economy. 46 According to 
Pitman Potter, a Professor of Law at UBC Law Faculty, over the course of Deng’s rule 
several official Government Documents (similar to a United States government Bill) 
were released in reference to religious activity and control. The Documents were 
strategically worded to offer a carefully structured allusion to religious tolerance, 
yet continued to stress the CCP’s ultimate support and aspiration toward a total 
atheist state. With the release of Documents 6 and 19, it became evident that the 
People’s Republic of China intended and still does intend to control religion in an 
effort to use it as a tool to guide and unify the masses in greater service solely to the 
success of the CCP regime. Specifically, Document 19 stated that the basic policy 
toward religion was “one of respect for and protection of religions, pending such 
                                                          
42 Potter, "Belief in Control: Regulation of Religion in China," 323. 
43 Ibid, 328. 
44 Ibid, 322. 
45 Ibid, 329. 
46 Ibid, 331. 
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future time when religion itself will disappear.”47 According to Potter, on the hand of 
obedience and compliance it promises tolerance, while on the hand of resistance to 
political orthodoxy it promises repression. Internally the state is viewed as 
“inherently hegemonic”48, and to have dominated the “structure of religious 
expression” in an effective and emotionless manner.  
The government’s politically biased method is simply making an assumption 
that the party-state’s domination of religion within society is complete when in 
reality it is not. The government has maintained an outward semblance of control 
over religious affairs within the PRC, such as  the number of churches allowed open, 
which religions can be practiced and where. However, it is becoming increasingly 
obvious that the aspirations of the CCP are being challenged by the influx of 
religious converts. Whereas it was a “commonly held impression that most 
Christians in China are old, less educated” members of the peasant class49, it has 
been observed that “an increasing proportion of urban converts are young and well-
educated professionals.”50 Also, it seems that certain religious affiliates have 
instigated a resistance as “underground churches, evangelists, and foreign 
missionaries have been active in many parts of the country” despite the risks. 51 In 
addition to these signs of resistance, it has been suggested that “Christianity today is 
commonly perceived as modern, cosmopolitan, and universal”52 to the Chinese. 
These things in combination have contributed to the current number of Chinese 
                                                          
47 Ibid, 319. 
48 Nanlai Cao, "Christian Entrepreneurs and the Post-Mao State: An Ethnographic Account of Church- State 
Relations in China's Economic Transition," Sociology of Religion 68, no. 1 (2007): 46. 
49 Yang, "Lost in the Market, Saved at MacDonalds," 429. 
50 Ibid, 424. 
51 Ibid, 430. 
52 Ibid, 438. 
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protestants and their exponential growth. “A conservative estimate favored by many 
leading scholars of religion within China puts their strength at around fifty 
million.”53  
Let us focus on the three strongest catalysts to this religious revival among 
the Chinese. Taking a broad perspective of observation into account, there are many 
reasons why the Chinese people are turning to religion with higher hopes than ever 
before.  
The first reason seems to be that despite Deng’s attempt to explain “that the 
Cultural Revolution was an aberration, perpetuated by Mao”, the people had already 
become disillusioned with Marxism-Leninism and began to “search for something to 
replace it.”54 Much like they did when religion was eliminated at the beginning of 
Mao’s reign and they turned to him to fill the void left behind. The problem was that 
“the ideologies of Marxism-Leninism and Mao do not answer the questions about 
human existence or give the kind of meaning to life that some people desire.”55 This 
was not just a desire, but a strong need within the people that was not being met. 
There was an “inability of Marxism-Leninism to deal with anything beyond the 
temporal world and its disregard of the inner being” and this inability loosened the 
hold on the ideal of atheism and “attracted those who were looking for spiritual 
answers.” A possible reason why Chinese converts seem to be increasingly younger 
than in previous years is that the younger generations have become disenchanted 
with Communism and many of them are actively seeking alternatives. 56 The CCP 
                                                          
53 Madsen, "The Upsurge of Religion in China," 63. 
54 Goldman, "Religion in Post-Mao China," 150. 
55 Ibid, 156. 
56 Yang, "Lost in the Market, Saved at MacDonalds," 435. 
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seems to have offered this semblance of tolerance in an effort “to lure and even 
coerce believers from their secret gatherings where it had no control, to public 
worship where it could reassert its control”57. Some say that in doing this, the CCP 
was inadvertently laying down some of the conditions for its own destruction.”58 In 
1989 there was a movement of democracy led by students of the intelligentsia 
which spilled into the streets on June 4 in Tiananmen Square. What began as a 
public mourning of Hu Yabong (an outspoken political activist) at his funeral 
became a demonstration by Chinese citizens to gain more political reform and was 
treated as a rebellion against the CCP. The government reacted more harshly than 
anyone expected and Tiananmen Square was a massacre where over 2600 people 
were killed by military force and many more were injured.59 Where previously Deng 
had begun to win the people over with his reforms, he was now seen in a much 
more severe and unfavorable light among the citizens of China. Despite such violent 
measures, people are becoming less afraid to speak up it seems, as “several people 
recalled the impact of the Tiananmen Square incident on their spiritual pursuit.”60 
This disillusionment with Chinese government and leadership is a huge factor in 
why the people have begun nurturing religious affiliation to replace their strong 
nationalistic history. 
Another aspect of this first factor is that when Deng took power he opened 
China up to the world economy in an effort to create strength and financial stability 
for the struggling country. Deng’s reforms in the Chinese economy have caused a 
                                                          
57 Goldman, "Religion in Post-Mao China,"  150-151. 
58 Madsen, "The Upsurge of Religion in China," 67. 
59 Mary E. Ward, Tiananmen Square Protest, publication, section goes here, accessed December 8, 2010, 
http://www.indiana.edu/~easc/publications/doc/tiananmen_square_protest.pdf, 6. 
60 Yang, "Lost in the Market, Saved at MacDonalds," 435. 
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large amount of instability and fear among the citizens who are unaccustomed to 
dealing with such volatile financial situations. In reform-era China, the emerging 
market economy “is exciting and perilous, accompanied by widespread moral 
corruption”61 which drives many to seek out ways of taking control through a 
theodicy that might reapply order to this chaotic and unfamiliar world. With so 
much confusion, is it any wonder why there are a significant number of Chinese 
converts? “Christianity is a faith that provides peace, certainty, and liberation amid 
bewildering market forces and a stifling political atmosphere.”62 
The second extremely important factor with regard to the rise in religious 
interest in China is “the rise of intellectuals”63. During Mao’s reign the perception of 
religion was carefully crafted of “fact and fiction, history and folklore, reasoned 
criticism and obscene calumny” to convince the populous that “Christianity (or, for 
that matter, Western culture generally) were the worst of all evils-an evil which 
China must at all costs avoid.”64 As a result, Christians were often viewed as having 
indulged in “incestuous and homosexual relations” as well as “fornicating freely 
with the members of the clergy” among many other invented and often exaggerated 
acts. These rumors contributed to the already confused perception that the people 
had towards Christianity and western culture. When Deng opened the door to 
religion he also re-opened the scholastic end of it and interested parties began 
tenuous research. Suddenly there were far too many interested people who wanted 
                                                          
61 Yang, "Lost in the Market, Saved at MacDonalds,"425. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Cao, "Christian Entrepreneurs and the Post-Mao State: An Ethnographic Account of Church- State Relations in 
China's Economic Transition," 109. 
64 Cohen, "The Anti-Christian Tradition in China," 176. 
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to learn about the truths of Christianity, “but too few evangelists who” had a good 
enough understanding or knowledge of the religion.65  
It is a very difficult pursuit in China to conduct research and write about 
religion. Such research usually requires large amounts of funding which is very 
difficult to come by under the CCP. In recent years where it became somewhat 
acceptable to study religions “the majority of publications are historical studies” 
rather than evangelical.66 To better explain the reason for “the lack of studies of 
contemporary religions,” first of all there is much easier access to historical 
materials and a deficiency in contemporary religious data available for studying.67 
Following the “opium war”68 religious research was legitimized as a discipline and 
“studying religion as a culture”69 became both respectable and necessary. Making 
advancements in the areas of religious scholarship became increasingly important, 
not just among the literati, but government officials and their necessity to 
undermine religion. After all, the allowance of certain religions was not without its 
limits because it was determined that for any religion to be considered legitimate, it 
must “work actively to build the harmonious society”.70 This scholastic interest 
unveiled the fact that Marxist dogmatism gave way to scientific principles which 
require “neutrality and objectivity, thus making it possible to affirm both the 
positive and the negative functions of religion.”71 If a religion was not seen as fit to 
                                                          
65 Yang, "Lost in the Market, Saved at MacDonalds," 431. 
66 Ibid, 114. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Yang, "Between Secularist Ideology and Desecularizing Reality: The Birth and Growth of Religious Research in 
Communist China," 106. 
69 Ibid, 108. 
70 Madsen, "The Upsurge of Religion in China," 66. 
71 Yang, "Between Secularist Ideology and Desecularizing Reality: The Birth and Growth of Religious Research in 
Communist China," 116. 
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accomplish its positive function, then “the state must guide them so that they do 
fulfill their obligations”.72 Overall the allowance of religious scholastic research has 
opened up avenues of perception that were previously impossible due to a lack of 
knowledge. While this type of research still faces difficulties with funding and 
available sources, the Chinese people are learning more about religions and their 
benefits to a society and using this knowledge as a weapon against the current state 
of political affairs. 
 The third and perhaps primary factor in why the Chinese people are turning 
towards religion, and more specifically Christianity, is the increasing exposure to 
western cultural influences due to the market economy and the many developing 
technologies of the modern era.  Madsen, a distinguished Professor of Sociology at 
the University of California, suggests that the religious movements in China are a 
result of the “fluidity of networks and the porosity of borders in an age of global 
hypercommunication.”73 The previously mentioned disillusionment of the current 
political regime and the influx of religious knowledge would not be possible if the 
people didn’t have some access to information outside of the CCP’s propaganda. 
Fenggang Yang, Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology and 
Anthropology at Purdue University, suggests that “throughout the 20th century, 
many educated Chinese tend to prefer a meaning system that is universal instead of 
particularly Chinese.”74 This means that most of the traditional Chinese religions 
supported by the government are viewed as “back-ward looking and 
                                                          
72 Ibid. 
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traditionalistic” which makes them a contradiction to the modern market economy 
that the people are adjusting to.75 Yang goes on to assert that the Chinese people’s 
tendency toward western influence has nothing to do with them necessarily 
wanting to be American or Western but rather to simply connect with the outside 
world that has been denied to them in recent years.76 It is a reflection of “the 
Chinese desire for global integration and modernity”.77 Madsen perpetuates this 
theory by suggesting that the Chinese government cannot stop outside religious and 
cultural influences because it is unable to seal off China completely from the outside 
world.78 Basically the Chinese people are encouraging western influences in their 
culture, such as being a Christian and speaking English, because it gives them what 
they view to be “an equal footing with the Americans and other Westerners as 
modern world citizens.”79  
These complex situations and viewpoints seem to be the main reasons why 
Christianity, rather than the more traditional Chinese religions such as Buddhism 
and Confucianism, is experiencing an unprecedented revival among the Chinese. 
Where previously Christians were treated as social pariahs and often violently 
persecuted, presently they appear to be widely accepted and oftentimes very 
successful occupationally as well.  
Christians who are associated with economic success are also helping to 
build support as the Chinese economy grows. Based off of the accounts offered here, 
                                                          
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid, 438. 
77 Ibid. 
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it also seems that the reason Christianity specifically is outpacing the other 
acceptable religions in modern China is because it is not rooted in Chinese national 
culture where the people have become so dissatisfied in the last fifty years. It is 
perceived as a Western mode of thought, and where many see traditional Eastern 
thought to have failed in practice, they see it as a beacon of hope for possible success 
because it is so different from what they have practiced in the past. The question 
that remains to be answered, is whether or not this switch toward active western 
religious affiliations will have any substantial effect on the Chinese socialist society, 
or if it will lose its appeal in the future in line with the success or failure of the CCP.  
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